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Abstract  
Business-to-business electronic commerce provides new mechanisms for interorganizational exchange 
governance. This study contributes to the research of the adoption of interorganizational exchange 
governance by developing an augmented constrained-efficiency framework that summarizes the 
salient factors influencing organizational selection and adoption of electronic exchange governance. 
Drawing upon the literature on organizational and interorganizational governance design and 
adoption, the augmented constrained-efficiency framework posits that organizational selection and 
adoption of electronic interorganizational exchange governance are an efficiency pursuing process 
and also constrained by some critical forces. Internally, the constraints include organizational 
decision makers’ bounded rationality and organizational resources and capabilities. Externally, an 
organization’s institutional environments, its dependency relationship, contractual arrangements and 
relational norms developed with its business partners through physical transactions are important 
constraining forces. To demonstrate the usefulness of the augmented constrained-efficiency 
framework, the paper applies it to the analysis of two important modes of electronic 
interorganizational exchange governance, namely electronic hierarchy and electronic marketplace. 
By doing so, the paper sets foundations for future theory development and empirical study. 
Keywords: Electronic exchange governance, constrained-efficiency framework, electronic 
marketplace, business-to-business electronic commerce. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The substantial impacts of business-to-business electronic commerce on organizations at 
microeconomic level and on the related supply chain and industry market structures at macro-level are 
partially brought about by its ability to serve as an effective mechanism for interorganizational 
exchange governance. There are diverse forms of electronic interorganizational governance available 
(Soh and Markus 2002), ranging from simple information links facilitating physical exchange 
governance to complex systems substituting physical governance thoroughly. Given the vast 
implications and the wide selection options of electronic interorganizational governance, insights into 
organizational adoption behavior and choosing criteria are of paramount importance and practical 
relevance. 
The studies that can provide such insights however bear some significant limitations. First researchers 
tend to examine organizational adoption and choice of electronic interorganizational exchange 
governances from technology (Koch 2002) and economic perspectives and neglect the implications of 
organizations’ current interorganizational governance (Christiaanse and Markus 2002). The general 
case however is that the adoption of business-to-business electronic commerce will bring new forms of 
engagement into the already existing exchange governance or simply replace it. Given the dramatic 
changes upon the adoption of electronic governance, it is deducible that the characteristics of 
preexisting governance would produce constraining or facilitating influences and shape organizational 
decision. Second, current research tends to study a single electronic governance mechanism (for 
example, EDI, e-procurement system) whereas in reality organizations may have more options. In fact 
technology developments provide multiple choices of electronic interorganizational governance 
feasible to accomplish a task. For instance, a firm can either use EDI to assist communication with its 
supplier or join an electronic reverse auction marketplace and select the supplier with the lowest bids 
to acquire supplies. Focusing on one form of interorganizational electronic governance may render 
researchers unable to account for some salient forces that influence organizational comparison of 
different electronic governance mechanisms and to offer a more complete picture of the process that 
an organization undergoes to reach its final decision to adopt a particular form of governance 
mechanism.  
Aiming to address the above limitations, our research attempts to mount an initial conceptualization of 
organizational adoption and selection of electronic interorganizational governance. Drawing upon the 
literature on organizational and interorganizational governance this study develops an augmented 
constrained-efficiency framework. The framework conceptualizes the adoption and selection of 
electronic interorganizational governance as an efficiency seeking process within certain constraints. 
The paper also applies the framework to the analysis of organizational choice of two important 
electronic interorganizational governances, namely electronic hierarchy and electronic marketplaces. 
By addressing the adoption issue, which is of paramount importance in the development of 
interorganizational electronic governance given the effect of critical mass (Koch 2002), this research 
also makes important contributions to the practice. The framework can guide practitioners to derive 
knowledge of what drives and what impedes organizational adoption of electronic governance and 
knowledge of how customers’ preferences vary across different forms of electronic governance given 
their different contexts. The knowledge is thus useful, for example, for electronic governance 
developers and providers to segment potential companies according to their different willingness to 
adopt electronic governance and conceive targeted product development strategy and marketing 
strategy. The research may also help investors interested in electronic governance generate more 
accurate expectations of the returns on their investments based upon better understanding of their 
acceptance among companies under their current economic and contextual conditions. 
2 THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AN AUGMENTED CONSTRAINED-
EFFICIENCY FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTRONIC 
INTERORGANIZATIONAL EXCHANGE GOVERNANCE ADOPTION 
2.1 Interorganizational design and electronic exchange governance 
Organizations are open systems consisting of elements that not only are interdependent on each other 
internally but also relate to some elements in the territories of other organizations on exchange basis. 
Thus, internally, organizational design deals with task division, job structuration and networking, and 
authority allocation. Externally, organizational design is more of the nature of exchange governance 
and determines what and how to interact with other organizations. Therefore, interorganizational 
exchange governance can be described along two dimensions – the boundary and the interface. Figure 
1 presents a simplified model showing the two dimensions involved in the interorganizational 
transaction activities. There are four companies in the value chain, W, X, Y, Z. Company X performs 
activities S1, S3, S4, and S6 internally and procures S2, S7, and S5 from company Y, Z, and W 
respectively. The three sides of the central triangle define the organization’s boundaries and the 














Figure 1.             Modelling the Dimensions of Interorganizational Exchange Governance 
The early theoretical development of organizational design focuses on what determines an 
organization’s boundary (e.g., Williamson 1981). It provides identification of the scope and shape of 
an organization and the location of organizational boundaries for the transactions of interest, i.e., it 
helps draw the triangle in Figure 1. Further analytical explorations extend organizational design 
research to the various types of interfacing mechanisms among organizations. The research is more 
concerned with the linkages between transaction activities (S1 and S2, S4 and S5, and S3 and S7 in 
Figure 1) with the specific governance mechanisms employed for carrying out the exchanges being its 
primary interests.  For example, Joskow (1987) studied the length of contract duration to the benefits 
of the parties in the exchange; Osborn and Baughn (1990) compared the choice of joint venture and 









examined the degree of collaboration between exchange partners. In most cases, the governance 
mechanisms enforce exchanges contractually, physically, and socially. 
With fast development and deep penetration, information technologies show increasingly significant 
influence on organizational design. Besides their profound impact on organization internal design 
(Nault 1998) and ability to redefine organizational boundaries (Afuah 2003), information technologies 
and systems also give rise to the proliferation of electronic mechanisms for interorganizational 
exchange. In as early as 1980s, without many empirical references, Malone, Yates and Benjamin 
(1987) have foreseen the abilities of information systems to change interfacing mechanisms 
fundamentally. It is proposed that information technologies, enabled by their inherent communication, 
brokerage, and integration effects, would create electronic markets, which assemble supply and 
demand forces and coordinate the flow of resources involved in the supply chain. Malone, Yates and 
Benjamin (1987) predicted the shift to electronic markets for exchanges from physical market and 
physical and electronic hierarchies. In a similar vein, Bakos (1991a, 1991b) stressed the effects of 
information systems on the interfacing mechanism between the adjacent supply chain parties by 
setting up information links and electronic marketplaces and projected the development of electronic 
marketplaces in the long run favorably.  One important implication of the above arguments is that 
given that an appropriate electronic marketplace is present, there is a high possibility that an 
organization would participate in it for exchange purpose and at the same time establish partner 
relationships, which would be more efficient than its preexisting physical ones. Taking Company X in 
Figure 1 for example, it is very likely that at least one of S1-S2, S4-S5, and S3-S7 would be replaced 
by new electronic link. 
On the contrary, Clemons and Row (1992) valued interorganizational relationships and argued that 
information systems could strengthen the relationships. Clemons, Reddi, and Row (1993) proposed 
that organizations would adopt a “move to the middle” strategy to maintain long-term relationships 
with a few partners and information systems would be used to sustain such relationships effectively. 
Applying the “move to the middle” hypothesis to company X, it is most likely that it will invest in 
information technologies to enhance its partnerships with W, Y, and Z. 
The conflicting conclusions derived above could be explained by the different business and economic 
situations assigned to the organizations by the researchers; however, they also signify the lack of an 
overarching framework for communicating and sharing the research on electronic exchange 
governance. Furthermore, the importance of exchange governance to organizational overall activities 
and performance also necessitates the development of a framework of interorganizational electronic 
exchange governance adoption, which may serve as a practical guide or benchmark. Considering that 
exchange governance is a specific organizational design, we attempt to derive such a framework by 
drawing upon the literature on organizational and interorganizational governance adoption and change. 
2.2 Literature on organizational and interorganizational governance design 
Interorganizational exchange governance deals with transactions through which organizations acquire 
necessary resources. Being the most influential theory of exchange governance, transaction cost 
economics (Williamson 1981) is distinctive in its focus on exchange transactions. Following the 
tradition of efficiency approach to organizations of economics, transaction cost economics proposes 
that the adoption of organizational transaction governance is determined by the comparative efficiency 
of acquiring from external markets or producing internally. The focus on transaction and efficiency 
makes transaction cost economics accepted extensively and subsequent developments extend it to 
analysis of organizational employment of diverse mechanisms of interorganizational exchange 
governance (Leffler and Rucker 1991, Heide and John 1990, Dutta et al 1995).  
However, transaction cost economics bears some limitations (Robins 1987). For example, the optimal 
levels of efficiency offered by the strict comparative-efficiency framework of transaction cost theory 
are valid only in the extreme case of perfect competition (Roberts and Greenwood 1997). Focusing 
solely on competitive environment makes transaction cost economics an undersocialized approach 
without adequate appreciation of the institutional environment and its implications for organizational 
economic behaviors. To address this limitation, Roberts and Greenwood (1997) developed 
constrained-efficiency framework by grafting institutional theory into the comparative-efficiency 
framework, which is an important theoretical advance of organizational governance research. 
Institutional theory has its primary interest in the effects of various institutional influences on 
organizational behaviors with the underpinning assertion that organizations will attempt to conform to 
the pressures from the social environment in which they exist to become isomorphic with 
institutionally prescribed expectations (Scott 1987; Slack and Hinings 1994; Westney 1993).  
Empirical studies validate the tendency toward increasing homogeneity over time in organizational 
design as a result of reactions to the influences of the ideas, values, and beliefs that originate outside of 
an organization in the institutional context (Slack and Hinings 1994; Greenwood & Hinings 1996).  
Constrained-efficiency framework posits that the institutional influences in the forms of mimetic, 
coercive and normative pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1973) will affect all of the four steps, namely 
evaluation of current design, search for alternative organizational designs, formation of efficiency 
expectations, and design adoption, proposed by comparative-efficiency framework as necessary for 
adopting new organizational design. The framework suggests that organizational governance decisions 
are driven by efficiency maximization under the restrictions of organizational situations and external 
environment and what will be achieved would be satisfying as opposed to optimal. 
Another shortcoming of transaction cost economics is the oversimplification of organizations as 
bundles of contracts and transactions (Madhok 1996). Thus resource-based theory (knowledge-based 
theory included) (Conner and Prahaland 1996, Schilling and Steensma 2002) provides complementary 
view of organizational governance decision by conceptualizing organizations as bundles of resources 
and capabilities where individual skills, organization and technology are inextricably woven together 
through dynamic and interactive firm-specific processes (Nelson and Winter 1982).  The resources and 
capabilities may generate constraints for organizational economic pursuits (Madhok 1996). The most 
economic exchange governance mode is not necessarily the preferred one due to the diseconomies 
associated with acquiring the knowledge and developing capabilities. Similarly, less economic 
governances may be chosen because of the lack of relevant organizational resources (Madhok 1996). 
The above theoretical perspectives discuss the adoption of general interorganizational governance. For 
the electronic forms of interorganizational governance, Christiaanse and Markus (2002) highlighted 
the potential constraining effects of organizations’ current physical governance relationships. The 
constraints could be caused by organizational dependence on, contractual responsibilities specified by, 
and relational norms developed from current exchange governances. 
Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) suggests that few organizations are self-
sufficient with respect to their critical resources and have to rely on external organizations to some 
extent. The dependence introduces uncertainty into organizational functioning and cause imbalance of 
power in interorganizational relationship (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987). Interorganizational links are 
necessary for managing uncertainty and safeguarding organizational well-being. Thus an 
organization’s dependence on external environment will significantly shape interorganizational 
governance mechanisms serving as linkages to obtain critical resources (Heide 1994). 
Traditional exchange linkages are enforced contractually and socially. Contracting has been an 
effective way to govern interorganizational exchanges. Conventional contracting theory posits that 
market participants rely largely on economic and legal sanctions for the purpose of enforcing 
contractual obligations. The relational contract theory (Macneil 1980) however proposes that strict 
contractual arrangements prevail in discrete transaction whereas contemporary economy sees most 
exchanges occurring within the relation web organizations embed in. The relation nature of exchange 
fosters relational norms such as role integrity, relation preservation, and conflict harmonization norms 
among the exchange parties to complement the legal enforcement. As posited by the relational 
contract theory, any given interorganizational exchange embodies the combination of discreteness and 
relationalism and its governance involves both contract law enforcement and relational norms. 
2.3 An augmented constrained-efficiency framework 
The multiple theoretical perspectives above suggests a comprehensive framework for studying 
electronic interorganizational governance adoption in general and electronic marketplace in particular, 
which is named as augmented constrained-efficiency framework here (Figure 2). The framework 
conceptualizes organizational adoption of interorganizational electronic governance mechanism as an 
efficiency pursuing process and also recognizes the various constraints encountered in this process. 
Consistent with constrained-efficiency framework (Roberts and Greenwood 1997), organizational 
adoption of interorganizational electronic exchange governance undergoes four logic stages with the 
motivation to alter current exchange governance with a new one that is capable of offering higher 
efficiency level. There are three main sources of constraints influencing the adoption of electronic 
interorganizational exchange governance. Individually, organizational main decision makers’ biased 
predisposition (cognitive constraints) toward information technology in general and electronic 
interorganizational exchange mechanisms in particular may affect organizations’ overall adoption 
behavior. At organization level, organizational resources and capabilities affect organizational 
awareness of alternative modes of electronic exchange governance, efficiency expectations, and the 
ultimate adoption decision. The third source of constraints is organizations’ interactions with their 
environment. The augmented constrained-efficiency framework suggests four types of 
interorganizational constraints, including institutional environment, dependence relationship, 
contractual arrangements, and relational norms. The influences of the constraints manifest themselves 
by impacting on organizational evaluation of their current interorganizational governance, scope of the 
electronic governance alternatives developed, and the evaluation of these alternatives. Additionally the 
adoption of electronic exchange governance will produce feedback effects on an organization’s 
interactions with its institutional and business environments and on its resources and capabilities. 
3 AN APPLICATION OF THE AUGMENTED CONSTRAINED-EFFICIENCY 
FRAMEWORK: ADOPTION OF ELECTRONIC HIERARCHY AND 
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE 
To demonstrate the usefulness of the framework, we apply it to organizational comparison and 
adoption of electronic hierarchy and electronic marketplace. Electronic hierarchy functionally 
establishes electronic information link at the interface of two adjacent parties in a value chain, i.e., a 
supplier and a buyer. It represents either one-to-one or one-to-more integration (Malone, Yates, and 
Benjamin 1987; Bakos 1991). An exemplary technology of information links is EDI, which allows for 
electronic information exchange between a company and its suppliers or customers. On the other hand, 
electronic marketplace (EMP) allows participants to exchange information about market price and 
product offerings. It presents a more-to-more multilateral integration by gathering suppliers and 
buyers and providing them transaction opportunities and channels (Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 
1987; Bakos 1991). Although the two transaction governance mechanisms are different functionally 
and can promote organizational efficiency from different dimensions, both are variants of 
interorganizational information system. 
 
 
Figure 2:           Augmented Constrained-Efficiency Framework for Electronic Interorganizational 
Exchange Governance Adoption 
There are some views favoring electronic marketplaces over electronic hierarchy based on theoretical 
analysis (Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 1987; Bakos 1991). However, in practice, the development of 
electronic marketplaces is far from satisfactory (Krovi 2001). In contrast, with the advent of Internet, 
information technologies like Web-based EDI emerge to offer less capital-intensive and more open 
solutions for organizations to strengthen their interfirm information linkages (Mithas, Jones, and 
Mitchell 2002). Given their limited precious resources, organizations may need to make choice 
between or set priority for electronic hierarchy and electronic marketplace. We apply the augmented 
constrained-efficiency framework here to explore the forces driving and inhibiting organizational 
adoption of the two modes of electronic exchange governance. 
To make the study tractable, electronic hierarchy is materialized as an EDI system initiated by one of a 
company’s direct supply chain partners (thus it represents 1:1 relationship for the potential adopter and 
most likely 1:m from the initiator’s perspective). Electronic marketplace is designated to be a neutral 
electronic market mechanism (Kaplan and Sawhney 2000) offered by a third-party (e.g., market 
maker) (Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 1987) and represents more-to-more (m:m) relationships among 
business partners. The analysis involves company X and Y in Figure 1. There are two alternatives for 
X, being either to join EDI initiated by Y or join EMP (Y is not in EMP) initiated by a third-party 
company through certain channel. Company X is not allowed to make any changes to the systems of 
EDI and EMP; however, it can establish some interface applications to set up linkages between EDI 
and EMP with their management and production systems. The research settings also suggest the focus 
of analysis to be on the interorganizational constraints. As the major effects of electronic information 
link and marketplace are geared toward new interorganizational governance, the influence differences 
of internal constraints (i.e., cognitive constraints, organizational resource and capability constraints) 
on them are assumed to be trivial. 
According to the augmented constrained-efficiency organizational evaluation of alternative electronic 
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However, the new interorganizational governances also impose new costs. Therefore, the efficiency 
implications of EDI and EMP are derived from the balancing of the potential efficiency and costs. The 
most frequently examined factors from the perspective of transaction cost economics are asset 
specificity and transaction uncertainty (Willaimson 1981). Asset specificity reflects how easily the 
assets associated with a transaction are transferable to other transactions. The high transferability 
means low asset specificity. X’s adoption of EDI for transactions with Y would create higher asset 
specificity than its joining electronic marketplace does. X would find it difficult to use the EDI to 
engage in exchanges with other partners. On the other hand electronic marketplace would present 
more opportunities to establish business partnerships. 
Proposition 1: Company X will perceive higher asset specificity of adoption of electronic hierarchy 
than that of electronic marketplace. The perceived asset specificity will exert weaker negative 
influence on X’s intention to adopt electronic marketplace than to adopt electronic hierarchy. 
The opportunisms of exchange partners give rise to transaction uncertainty (Williamson 1981). In our 
context, if X adopted EDI, the uncertainty would remain at the same level as it transacts with Y 
physically. However, if X adopted EMP to transact with a strange partner, it would perceive relatively 
high uncertainty. There are two sources of the increased uncertainty. The first is directly from the 
potential opportunisms of the new partner. The lack of knowledge of the product and credibility of the 
new partner would translate into high risk in transactions. Secondly, the involvement of a third-party 
EMP provider would also increase X’s concern of uncertainty if there is a lack of trust mechanism 
(Pavlou 2002). 
Proposition 2: Company X will perceive higher transaction uncertainty of electronic marketplace than 
that of electronic hierarchy. The perceived transaction uncertainty will have significantly negative 
effects on X’s intention to adopt electronic marketplace whereas its effect on X’s intention to adopt 
electronic hierarchy will be insignificant. 
The augmented constrained-efficiency framework proposes that institutional environments help 
organizations derive efficiency implications of electronic mode of exchange governance. 
Organizational decision makers are not always able to accurately evaluate the efficiency level of 
governance alternatives due to either cognitive and organizational constraints or the lack of relevant 
formula and variables. Hence mimetic and normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) is 
widely observed from organizations’ reliance on the efficiency gains of other similar companies in the 
related industry to make decisions. If the environment in which an organization embeds presents 
organizational improvements as a result of the adoption and usage of a particular mode of electronic 
exchange governance, the organization would show high orientation toward that governance. 
Secondly, institutional environment could influence organizational adoption of electronic governance 
directly. The adoption decision is not necessarily made solely out of efficiency evaluations. 
Organizations may choose interorganizational governance that does not best address their efficiency 
concerns but sustains their legitimacy in the institutional environment. In this respect, coercive 
pressures are more visible than mimetic and normative ones, for example, to force an organization to 
adopt otherwise inefficient exchange governance if it has relatively weak power in transactions and 
loss of legitimacy might outweigh any expected efficiency gains. Thirdly, institutional environment 
also influence adoption of electronic exchange governance by affecting organizational awareness of 
alternative choices. However, since the research settings specify the alternatives of electronic 
hierarchy and marketplace, we forego the analysis here. 
Proposition 3: Institutional environment will significantly affect X’s intention to adopt both electronic 
hierarchy and electronic marketplace. If there are more applications of electronic hierarchy than 
electronic marketplace in the environment in which X embeds, X will show stronger intention to adopt 
electronic hierarchy than electronic marketplace, and vice versa.   
Organizational dependence on other organizations for critical resources creates power imbalance in 
interorganizational relationships. The dependence and power in exchange (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 
1987) affect electronic interorganizational governance adoption by influencing both efficiency 
expectation formation and adoption decision. The resource dependence imposes high switching cost 
for an organization if the channel to acquire the resource is subject to any changes. Thus in the 
evaluation of the efficiency of any alternative exchange governance for the critical resources, its 
impact on the dependency relationship must be taken into consideration. The direct effect of resource 
dependency on adoption decision produces a result similar to coercive isomorphism that the adoption 
of the electronic exchange governance endorsed by an organization’s partner may serve as a way to 
sustain the critical exchange relationship.   
Proposition 4: X’s dependence on Y will have significant positive influences on X’s efficiency 
expectation formation of and adoption intention toward electronic hierarchy and significant negative 
influence on X’s efficiency expectation formation of and adoption intention toward electronic 
marketplace. 
The contractual arrangements such as long term buying and supplying agreements between buyers and 
suppliers are used widely as effective mechanisms to protect organizations against uncertainties in 
interorganizational exchanges (Heide 1994). An organization’s attempt to change exchange 
governance with a partner will be constrained by their preexisting contractual arrangements. Tight 
contractual arrangements will encourage the adoption of new electronic exchange governance that is 
geared toward strengthening preexisting linkage and inversely discourage the adoption of electronic 
governance facilitating organizational selection and interaction with other potential partners.   
Proposition 5: The contractual arrangements between company X and its business partner will 
positively affect its intention to adopt electronic hierarchy whereas negatively affect its intention to 
adopt electronic marketplace. 
The relational norms developed between exchange partners shape organizational predisposition toward 
electronic exchange governance that may impose changes to preexisting interorganizational 
relationships. Two orientations manifest from the various relational norms. One orientation 
encompasses norms such as role integrity, relationship preservation, and harmonization of conflicts 
(Heide 1994), emphasizing on the long-term solidarity and continuity and each party’s commitment to 
the relationship. The other orientation reflects the flexibility between exchange partners and 
encourages arm’s-length relationship (Heide 1994). If the electronic governance in question is in 
conflict with the prevailing relational norms between X and Y, its diffusion into X would be subject to 
substantial inhibiting forces even though it may present potential efficiency implications.  
Proposition 6: The orientation of the relational norms between X and Y influences X’s adoption of 
electronic exchange governance. If the relational norms are solidarity oriented, X will present 
stronger intention to adopt electronic hierarchy than electronic marketplace; if the relational norms 
are flexibility oriented, X will present stronger intention to adopt electronic marketplace than 
electronic hierarchy. 
4 DISCUSSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This study conceptualizes organizational adoption of business-to-business electronic commerce as a 
process of inviting new mode of interorganizational governance to organizational design. Drawing 
upon research on organizational governance, it proposes an augmented constrained-efficiency 
framework. The augmented constrained-efficiency framework articulates the adoption of various 
modes of electronic governance as an efficiency-seeking process and confronted with internal and 
external constraints as well. The paper also presents an example of the application of the framework. 
The wide set of factors and their varying effects on organizational comparison and adoption of two 
important modes of interorganizational governance, electronic hierarchy and electronic marketplace, 
are examined within the framework. 
The proposed framework has important implications for theory development of business-to-business 
electronic commerce. First, the augmented constrained-efficiency framework provides a holistic 
perspective of electronic exchange governance adoption and can serve as a structuring model to 
facilitate the development of research agenda. With the framework the extant literature on 
interorganizational electronic governance could be clearly positioned and the arenas lacking research 
efforts could be easily identified. For example, there is a poverty of studies on the effects of 
interorganizational contractual arrangements and relational norms on the adoption of electronic 
exchange governance compared to the studies from organizational resource, institutional environments 
and organizational dependence perspectives. Second, the framework also sets theoretical foundation 
for empirical studies. Meanwhile, empirical studies can enhance the framework through validating the 
causalities proposed. In fact, the full value of the augmented constrained-efficiency framework hinges 
on its ability to offer empirically valid insights into organizational adoption of electronic governance. 
With regard to the analysis presented here, researchers may go beyond by relaxing the conditions of 
the settings.  For instance, the setting excludes company Y in EMP. If this constraint is relaxed, 
company X’s predisposition toward EMP will change significantly. Indeed, an organization’s 
encounter with its physical exchange partner in electronic marketplace is practically possible to 
happen given that the development of electronic marketplace will lead to the increase in the number of 
participants. 
Throughout the analysis the bias toward the effects of the constraining forces could be discerned. 
However, the bias should not be taken as the thrust of the augmented constrained-efficiency 
framework, which on the contrary proposes organizational search for the equilibrium between 
efficiency and constraints. The focus on constraints in the analysis is purposeful because of the 
relatively rich elaborations on the efficiency implications of electronic exchange governance in terms 
of cost reduction in information processing, sharing and searching (e.g. Bakos 1991b). Nevertheless, 
given the varying impacts of different modes of electronic interorganizational governance, scholars are 
strongly suggested to investigate the combined effects of the efficiency-driving factors and the 
constraining forces on organizational selection and adoption of business-to-business electronic 
commerce mechanisms.   
The paper examines only two scenarios, electronic hierarchy and electronic marketplace. Future 
research could enhance the generalizability of the framework by studying other forms of electronic 
mechanism. Examples include information links provided by third parties or biased electronic 
marketplaces maintained by the party involved directly in the transaction (Kaplan and Sawhney 2000). 
More dynamics among organizational efficiency pursuits and constraints are expected given the 
complexity of the contexts. 
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